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Under the cloak of this Tolstoyian title, I would 
like to take up a highly controversial matter, the matter of 
Berlin, and I would like to take it up in terms that court 
disagreement. But one trouble with foreign policy, like this 
convocation series thus far, is that there is not too much 
disagreement and controversy, but too little. In my own limit-
ed way, in discussing the problem of Berlin in the context of 
the broader topic of war and peace, I should like to contri-
bute to making up the lack. 
It is tragically understandable that we Americans 
are perturbed and perplexed about the problem of Berlin. It 
is a vexatious problem. But we are talking here about Berlin 
in relation to war and peace. Words like "perturbed" and 
"perplexed" and "vexatious" are not words properly applied to 
a problem inv~lving the issue of war or peace. Maybe they 
were once. But today, in the thermonuclear age, war or peace 
not only means victory or defeat; war or peace today means 
survival or extinction. One cannot talk sanely about any 
problem in international relations--let alone Berlin--unless 
this cardinal fact is kept in mind. 
Now under what conditions does one sanely undertake 
extinction? Under what conditions does one consider certain 
death? There may be those, employing the grisly neo-logic and 
neo-morality of Herman Kahn and the Rand Corporation, who de-
2 bate about what survival of a thermonuclear holocaust means; 
whether it· means 100 million killed or only 50 million. But 
I am not among them. Such aebate has all the reality of me-
dieval polemics about how many angels on the head of a pin. It 
is qUite true that, if there were a thermonuclear war, some 
Americans might survive--perhaps millions--although under what 
conditions of fallout and radioactivity one can only speculate 
in horror--some might survive, but I defy any sane and honest 
person to challenge me when I say that under no possible, con-
ceivable circumstances could the American system of demociacy 
and humanism and free private enterprise survive a thermo-
nuclear war. The apparent failure of American public lead-
ers to understand this fact is perhaps the greatest danger 
we face, and the failure of American public leaders to make 
it clear to our people is their most awful dereliction of 
duty. 
Now, does this mean that under no conceivable con-
ditions one should risk thermonuclear war? I respect those 
who answer in the affirmative, but I cannot agree. I can con-
ceive of conditions in which a thermonuclear war--with all its 
immorality and horror and illogic--should be risked. Some, 
but not very many. But that there may be any at all only 
testifies to the madness of the world we live in. Essentially, 
the only conditions under which it would ever be permissible 
to risk thermonuclear war would be those in which .a vital in-
terest of the United States was threatened, in which our se-
curity was directly menaced. This is one reason--and the 
most important one--why a review of what constitutes vital 
American interests, of what constitutes a menace to our se-
curity, is long overdue. 
Let me say before going any further--and let me say 
it as emphatically as I can--that I am profoundly convinced 
there is no conceivable justification for considering that 
Berlin today rationally involves the question of peace or war. 
I do not doubt the honesty o;f those of our leaders who tell us 
that it does. But I do doubt their ability, their judgment, 
their knowledge, their obje-ctivity and their sense of perspective 
and proportion. They are, after all, the same men who were 
telling us just a few short months ago that the problem of Laos 
presented to us the question of war or peace--the problem of 
Laos, that was created or~ginally by American intervention to 
overthrow a constitutionally established and popularly supported 
government. The problem of Laos is now fading to obscurity 
because those people who told us that it involved the question 
of war or peace are accepting the same government whose over-
3 throw we originally accomplished, and are abandoning the 
regime for which they told us we might have to go to war. 
Those people who are telling us Berlin involves the question 
of war or peace are the same people, also, who so sadly com-
promised us in Cuba an even shorter time ago because they do 
not know hoVi to recognize a social revolution when they see 
one and seem to know as little about Communism as they do 
about international politics, which is very little indeed. 
Must I now accept without question the judgment of these 
same men that whether I and- my family, and you and your fami-
lies, and we and our country, and our society and its civili-
zation, live or die is to be determined by what happens in 
Berlin? 
I agree just as much as anyone that, as the saying 
has it, we should not give in to the Soviet Union, or to any-
body else, where our vital .interest, our security, is at stake. 
And I agree just as much as anybody that, as the saying has it, 
we should not let ourselves "be pushed around by the Russians." 
But the truth is that our vital interest and our security are 
not involved in Berlin and that the Russians are not "pushing 
us around. II A great deal of contrary t~lk is coming out of 
Washington these days, and this, then, becomes the basis for 
even wilder newspaper talk. If any of this has any other pur-
pose than to whip up a war hysteria, I don't know what it is o 
Admittedly Southern California is ' an unusual case study in 
this regard. But this matter of Berlin is distorted out of 
all recognition not only in our Southern California but through-
out the nation. I would be willing to bet ten dinars to a 
ruble, that very, very few peop~e, here or elsewhere, who 
accept this extreme view of the matter even know what the 
Russians are really proposing about Berlino 
W.ha-~, in fact, are they proposing? Not· that the 
United States be "pushed out of Berlin." We would be per-
fectly right in refusing to be "pusl}.ed out of Berlin," but 
the Russians are n~t proposing this. We are right, too, in 
feeling that '/,e have commitments to the West Berliners--IIthe 
freedom-loving West-Berliners,--to save them from Communism," 
as the saying goes o Having made so loudly and so often these 
commi tments--whether they are wise .or not--we cannot, of 
course., suddenly ignore them noVi. But the .Russians are not 
asking for this, either. What the Russians want to do, they 
say, is to make a Ger~an peace treaty that would normalize 
and formalize their East German State and the Oder-Niesse 
boundary w~th Poland, and normalize and formalize the highly 
abnormal division of Berlin. Specifically, ~~. Khrushchev 
4 says, such treaty could provide for stationing of Amerioan 
and other Western troQPs in West Berlin. It could provide, 
he says, even that which we d~ntt have now, despite some 
assertions to the contrary--legal right of access through 
the territory of East Germany. Do we want this? Or if we 
don't, why? And what do we want? To answer these questions, 
it is necessary to look at Berlin in the larger context of 
Germany. 
The problem of Berlin arose as a result of the four-
power occupation of Germany following the defeat of the Nazis. 
Germany was, as you all know, divided into zones, with the 
Soviet armed forces controlling the Eastern zone--roughly that 
area already occupied by them at the end of the war--and two 
Western zones, one for the Americans and one for the British; 
and the Americans subsequently brought in the French, to whom 
was given control of a part of our original zone. Each mili-
tary commander was to have absolute authority on political 
matters in his own zone, subject to the proviso that matters 
affecting the whole of Germany, especially economic matters, 
were to be determined by a quadripartite allied control coun-
cil situated in Berlin. Berlin itself was divided into four 
sectors, one for each occupying power. And Berlin was deep 
inside the Soviet zone. There is room for questioning the wis-
dom of the details of this arrangement--which resulted from 
the Yalta and Potsdam conferences--and even more room for 
criticizing the failure of the Americans and their Western 
allies to obtain a formal agreement guaranteeing them free 
access at all times to West Berlin, but it does little good 
to dwell on these pOints now. 
'!rhe aim of this arrangement-agreed on by all con-
cerned--waa that after taking of reparations and reordering 
German political and economic life, the four zones would be 
unified into a Single German state. Meanw.hile, at Potsdam, 
the powers agre~d to a revision of Germany's Eastern borders, 
in favor of the Poles and the Russians. The boundary tenta-
tively agreed on was roughly along the line of the Oder and 
Niesse Rivers, with this line to be ratified, give or take a 
lit~le here or there, by a German peace treaty later. This 
peaoe treaty has never been worked out, and that is, in part, 
what Khrushchev wants now. One reason why there was no peace·-
treaty is that quadripartite control of Germany broke down al-
most before it began. It is fashionable in the United States 
to put the blame for this break-down altogether on the Soviet 
5 Union, just as it is fashionable in the USSR to put the blame 
altogether on the United States. Both were guilty, and in 
just about equal degree. But there was also the disruptive 
role of the French, who never signed the Potsdam agreement 
even when they were made an occupying pov/er. Paris insisted 
that if the USSR and Poland were to bet part of Germany on the 
East, France dhould get part of Germany on the West o And fail-
ing this, the French obstructed the work of the Allied Control 
Council, which, consequently, was unable to establish all-Ger-
man political parties, labor organizations, postal system or 
anything else. 
Meanwhile, the Russians--destroyed, impoverished and 
greedy--began an action Which certainly violated the Potsdam 
agreement in spirit if not in letter--the taking of reparations 
from their zone of Germany by operating factories on the spot 
and shipping off all the production to the USSR, rather than 
by the slovler and supposedly agreed upon process of dismantlini5 . 
This caused a strain on the occupation economy in all zones and 
had a severe inflationary effect. The West retaliated by re-
neging on promised reparations shipments from its zones to the 
USSR. Moscow in turn retaliated by reneging on promised food 
and fertilizer shipments from its zone to the Western zones. 
Then the Western powers, perhaps necessarily but still in clear 
violation of the treaty, adopted a West zonal currency and pre-
pared to merge their three zones into one. It was in retalia-
tion for this that Moscow in 1948 began the Berlin Blockade. 
By now the wartime agreements on Germany were al-
ready, as I~. James P. Warburg says, a dea~ letter. The cold 
war was well under way_ And the United States was committed 
to the idea, long propagated by men like the late James V. 
Forrestal, that it was necessary to build up Germany as a mi-
litary buffer to Soviet powe~. To accomplish this, the Wes-
tern powers, under American leadership, -~ook a fateful step 
that changed the Whole complexion of the German situation. 
They established their merged Western zones into a new, se-
parate, independent German state--Ylest Germany. Originally 
the rationale for the western powers being in Berlin was that 
this was necessary for quadripartite control and administra- ' 
tion of Germany, looking toward a unified German state with 
Berlin as its capital. The Western action in establishing a 
'{lest German state brought an abrupt end to this rationale. As 
many foresaw, the Soyiet Union almost immediately followed 
suit and created an East German state under its domination. 
There were now t ... 70 German states, east and west, Olle as valid 
and as legal as the other. 
6 At this pOint some kind of German unification might 
still have been possible. It was now made virtually impossible. 
not by Soviet action but by American action in launching the 
militarization of the West German state. There was already, 
it is true, a sizeable police force in existence in East Ger-
many. While the evidence is that these so-called East German 
"alert groups" were primarily for the purpose .of asserting 
Communist control, they did provide a nucleus on which an 
army could be built. But they were not an ar.my. The only 
real military force in East Germany was the Soviet Army, just 
as the only real military force in West GermaIl1' was the Ameri-
can army, backed by British and French troops. 
The Americans and some of their Western allies, how-
ever, were obsessed with fear of Soviet military aggression, 
with fear that suddenly the Soviet army might begin a march 
toward the English Channel. One does not have to debate here 
the validity of this fear, although, as some o~ you know, I 
am firmly in agreement with George Kennan and many others who 
feel that such a danger of Soviet military aggression never 
existed. To guard against it, however, the Americans and their 
allies organized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO 
then, as NATO up until recently, consisted primarily of Ameri-
can troops and a paper organization. It was apparent that if 
NATO was ever to be anything else, it would have to have par-
ticipation by West Germany, already beginning its amazing eco-
nomic recovery. Accordingly, the Americans took the second 
fateful step, beginning--against the violent opposition of not 
only the USSR but many others--the militarization of West Ger-
many. The government of Konrad Adenauer, if not its people, 
were more than willing. Soon the Soviet Union again followed 
suit and militarized East Germany. 
Now ostensibly our. goal was still Unification--or by 
this time, better stated, reunification--of Germany. There 
was, obviously, only one way this could ever be accomplished, 
and this was by agreement with the Soviet Union. But the 
Soviet Union made it clear over and over again that they would 
never agree to reunification if it meant the possibility of 
a rearmed Germany in NATO. The United States, meanWhile, had 
oriented its whole European policy around the idea of a strong 
NATO, which meant German participatioh. That being the basis 
of our 'policy, it followed that we would not agree that a re-
unified Germany must be excluded from NATO. The result was 
that there were never--at any time--any real negotiations on 
German reunification. It is a misstatement of fact bordering 
on falsehood to say, as Secretary Dulles and President Eisen-
7 hower once said, that the Soviet Union agreed at the 1955 Summit 
Conference to reunification by free elections and then went 
back on its pledge. The Soviet agreement was only on condition 
that the reunified German state be excluded from NATO, and to 
this we would not consent. 
~ytt"ment'»igM-k ~~ tassi£ff.:: •• 
Would the Russians ever have agreed to a reunified 
Germany on terms we could have accepted? Maybe not. But we 
don't know. In the apt words of . George Kennan, "we shall never 
know whether the Russi~s will go through an .open door until 
we stop trying to push them through a closed one." Why might 
the Russians ' have agreed to go through an open door, that is, 
c.onsented to a non-Communist and neutral r'eunified Germany? 
One reason is that this would have formalized the territorial 
arrangements in Eastern Europe. Another is that it would have 
removed Western troops from the border of this vital Soviet 
core interest. A third is that it would ;lave remov,ed from ·the 
heart of Europe a problem which, unsolved, constantly threat,ened 
t .o disrups th:e peace. There are two inaications that the Russians 
might have gone through an open door if we had stopped trying to 
force them through a closed one. One indication was the Soviet 
endorsement of proposals for mutual disengagement of troops 
from Central Europe and even from parts of their own ~ast~rn 
Europe--proposals which we refused to discuss. Another indi-
cation ~s what happened in East GermrulYo The ' East German 
state is, of course, a Soviet puppet, tight under the Soviet 
thumb, and always has been. But it is highly significant 
that there had taken place no full socialization in East Ger-
many, of the type that 1Dok place in the Eastern European 
satellites. Neither full nationalization nor any collectivi-
zation of agriculture to speak of had been undertaken; there 
even existed the shells of opposition political parties, how-
ever meaningless. It was only in 1958, when West Germ~was 
well on its way to full rearmament and completely integrated 
in the Western system, and when disengagement was turned down 
as a subject for discussion, ,that the full satellization of 
East Germany took place and that East Germany became , fully in-
tegrated into the Soviet bloc and ' given an equal status with 
the other satellite states. 
~~t~ passwiJi1Us VMH,s~ •• ~ 
Up until this time, the rationale for Western pre-
sence in Berlin--now no longer legal--was diplomatic. ~hat 
is, it was a gambit ~n the politics of reunification, and as 
such it, made sense. Since Berlin was symbolic as the tradi-
tional capital of 'Germany, Western presence there, keeping the 
8 city from full Communist influence, might have been a factor 
in the kind of reunification and in the orientation of a reuni-
fied German state. But now reunification was out of the question. 
No longer did the Russians want it, if they ever did. And the 
West Germans, and the American!! also, did not want it, no 
matter what they said; or if they did want it, the methods 
they pursued--insistence on a reunified Germany in NATO--now . 
more clearly than ever _prevented the wish from having any real 
meaning. This being the case, even the diplomatic rationale 
for our being in Berlin--that it was a maneuver concerned with 
reunification--vanished. 
It was at this time that Khrushchev broached tne idea 
of a German peace treaty and an alteration of the situation in 
Berlino 
It is necessary here to say a word about West Ger-
many. It is important to realize that West Germany is by 
far and away the strongest nation in Europe, economically 
and militarily also, if the USSR is excluded. It dominates 
the Common Market. Among the non-American members, it domin-
ates NATO. And the fact is that West Germany has come also 
to dominate American policy in Europe. 
Now West Germany, just like all other st ates, has 
its own intrerests, German interests. These are not American 
interests, except, perhaps, incidentally. This is entirely 
natural. Bu~ it is not entirely natural that the United States 
continues to act as though Germany interests were always and 
necessarily our own interests. The West made this mistake 
about Germany once before, after the Locarno Treat yo The 
British and French actually expected Germany to help them 
maintain the Versailles Treaty, Which was aimed against Ger-
many. Operating on the incredibly naive assumption that be-
cause Foreign Minister Stresemann talked a good game of 
"Western unity," the British and French never suspect·ed that 
he was, at the same time, beginning the secret and illegal re-
armament of Germany th~t was to have its tragiC climax in the 
Gotterdammerung of World War II. 
Now I do not think that the West German state is 
like the Nazi Reich--although it does have many former Nazis 
in high places--nor that it has intentions of trying to domi-
nate Europe militarily. But I do think that West Germany, in 
furthering of German interests as it sees them, is a provocative, 
disruptive force which as much as any other single factor stands 
in the way of a peaceful European settlement. In one way, the 
West .German policy has t£e result--whether or not the intention--
9 of doing exactly what Nazi policy sought to do--which is to 
cause conflict between the United states and the Soviet Union, 
albeit f or different reasons. 
I"t mus ·t; be remembered that Germans are Germans. To 
say this is not to make an invidious slur on a whole people. 
But it is to say that politically the Germans, en masse, as 
a social group, have repeatedly demonstrated their political 
immaturity. And I, for one, can see nothing in the policy 
of West Germany now that demonstrates otherwise. 
Certainly American policy cannot escape some onus 
here. We do not have to do what the West Germans want us to 
do. The impact of the war created a profound anti-militarism 
among Germans., especially young Germans. It is thanks to our 
own efforts, in part, that they now have a government which is 
thoroughly militarily oriented and which is steadily becoming 
more so. This has come so gradually that one is hardly aware 
of it. I well recall being in Frankfurt and Bonn in 1950, on 
a mission for the U.S. State Department, when there were news-
paper reports that the West German government had a "defense 
adviser." This was indignantly denied by both the Americans 
and the Germans, although everybody knew it was true. Then it 
was admitted, but the West Germans said, solemnly, no defense 
ministry. A few months later the defense adviser became minister 
of defense, but, the West Germans said, no army. A few months 
later there began to be organized a German army, but said the 
West Germans, no traditional uniforms and no generals. A few 
months later the army donned the traditional uniforms and the 
rank of general was reestablished, but, it was said, no general 
staff, and so on. About the same time West Germany adopted as 
its national anthem the infamous "Deutschland uber Alles," but, 
it was said, the first verse, containing the offensive words, 
would not be used. Now the ~them begins, as before, "Deutsch-
land, Deutschland, uber Alles." Goethe, in an untypical poetic 
burst of patriotism, once wrote that when he thought of ~ermany 
he could not sleep. It is not surprising that today a gr.eat 
many other people capnot sleep when they think of Germany--but 
for other reasons. 
wlig tk 811m umnutttHt r~ei pasr-WIW st1#tmmts .--
The provocative .aspect of West German policy is illus-
trated in the altogether unwarranted claim of the Adenauer 
government to jurisdiction of Berlin. It is illustrated by 
the refusal to accept the Oder-Niesse line. It is illustrated 
by the inclusion in the Bonn government of a "minister of all-
10 German affairs" and by West Germany's refusal--backed by the 
United States--to recognize the East German government and by 
its use of diplomatic .pressure on any state that does recog-
nize it. Perhaps the single largest identifiable political 
group in West Germany is the . so-called Volksdeutsche, those 
Germans who fled or were expelled from the Prussian provinces 
now part of Poland and Russia, from the Sudetenland in Czecho-
slovakia and from other parts of Eastern Europe. They tend to 
be strident nationalists. What the Volksdeutsche want"of 
course, is a return to Germany of their property.' They are 
dispossessed and desperate. Officially they abjure thoughts 
of war. But how they expect to achieve a return of territory 
from Poland and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, they don't 
say. These Volksdeutsche are a significant factor in the Bonn 
government's refusal to accept the post-war settlements. And 
the West German policy is a significant factor in the American 
refusal to accept them. 
Wh:/ JUJ Jfti({futY d1stngRgtmt;~ •• 
West German policy is not only provocative but arro-
gantly so. The one hope of a real German settlement might have 
been military disengagement, and at one point President Eisen-
hower seems to have considered this idea. But the West German 
government as much as said, "you can't adopt such a ,policy," 
t hat is, having rearmed, they were not going to disarm and the 
United States couldn't make them. It was right here in Clare-
mont, in 1958, in Bridges Auditorium, that the German Ambassa-
dor, Dr. Grewe, publicly defied the United States in ' th~s regard. 
He was not arrogant in tone, but that is the only word for the 
content of his remarks. He was, as I recall, applauded roundly. 
Of course, the Wes~ Germans are right. It is now too 
~ate; we can't make the Germans disarm if they don't want to. 
And far from wanting to, they are now demanding nuclear weapons, 
as they demanded in the past, successfully, operational bases 
f or their troops in Western Europe. One might well ask, "Who 
,'fon World War II, anyway?" 
In the same way, the West Germans are now calling 
the tune on Berlin and are, in effect, dictating American po-
licy. No compromise Qn Berlin, the West Germans say. And 
why? Because Herr Adenauer insists that West Berlin is a part 
of West Germany. He and his government insist that the East 
German state has no right to exist. They insist on German 'un-
ity, by which they simply mean expanding the present West Ger-
man re'p1.tblic to include all of Germany, including--including, 
mind y ,'"": ",--those former parts of Prussia now incorporated into 
Poland and. the Soviet Union. A German peace treaty, such as 
called for by Khrushchev, would, of course, "legalize" the di-
11 vision · of Germany, would require the de facto if not de jure 
recogni tion of East Germany and would force the West Germans 
to accept the Oder-Niesse line. 
Now obviously if the Soviet Union is to be defied on 
these matters, it will be defied by the United States, not . by~ 
West Germany. Come on, say the West Germans, lets you defy the 
Russians. One can excuse the West Germans for taking this line 
more easily that one can excuse the Americans for falling for 
it. Is it not time that we have a policy of our own on Berlin 
and on Germany, reflecting American rather than German interests? 
Just what American interests are affected by the Soviet 
proposal on Berlin'? To answer this it must first be realized 
that the present situation in Berlin is highly abnormal and im-
permanent by its very nature. I~ is absolute nonsense to talk 
about this Berlin situation--as Secretary of State Rusk has 
done--as being part of a "status quo" that must be ma.int ained 
at all costs. It cannot be maintained indefinitely, no matter 
what the Russians do or don't do. It is no policy at all to re-
iterate that we will "stand firm" in such a situation. And it 
is only sophistry to assert--as President Kennedy "and others 
have done--that since the United States is demanding no change 
in the Berlin situation, the issue arises only because of 
Soviet trouble-making. Our position in Berlin is untenable 
militarily, diplomatically and legally. The handful of Ameri-
can troops in the city no more keeps the Russians out than does 
the Claremont ROTC. If the Russians are kept out by anything 
other than their own restraint, it is by American nuclear de-
terrent power. Meanwhile, peace treaty or no peace treaty, we 
and the West Berliners are at the mercy of the Russians and 
the East Germans. It is high time we faced up to this un-
pleasant fact. There are a thousand and one things they could 
do to make the whole jerry-built structure collapse any time 
they wanted to. Merely changing the currency system would, as 
Mayor Brandt has said, bring an economic collapse. Endless 
examination of passage papers or constant repairs on roads and 
bridges could halt our access. Are we prepared to go to war 
over the Communists' right to change their own currency? Or 
over their right to repairs roads and bridges? Or over the 
extent of their burea,ucratic inefficiency? 
The fact is that, given the unlikelihood of reunifi-
cation and given the hard, cold realities of international po-
litics, Berlin ultimately is almost certainly going to become 
the capital of the state in which it is located--East Germany. 
But we are not being asked to consider that. Compromises are 
open to us. One does not have to agree with the Khrushchev pro-
12 posals to see that the Soviet concern over the present situa-
tion is not unnatural. What is the present situation as it 
must appear to Moscow? A western enclave ensconced far inside 
one of their satellite states. west Germany and the United 
States refusing to recognize Eas·t Germany, refusing to accept 
the Oder-Niesse line, talking about ending Soviet hegemony in 
Eastern Europe. Even without their paranoia, the Russians 
might see all this as a threat. The fact is that the Soviet 
position on Berlin is not extreme, that it has not lacked re-
straint. Mr. Khrushchev has repeated over a period of years--
at times almost plaintively--that he considers the present im-
permanent arrangement a source of instability in Central Europe 
and that the USSR attaches great interest to a change. 
Actually, it is by no means clear that our position 
in Berlin might not actually be enhanced by a peace treaty 
something like the one the Soviet Union proposes. If we want 
to go to war over our rights in Berlin or over what the Commu-
nists might do to the freedom-loving people of ·West Berlin, we 
can do so under conditions of a peace treaty as well as we can 
now. To say that the Soviet proposal does not adversely 
affect our true interest in Berlin assumes, of course, that our 
interest is in European stability and reduction of tensions. 
There can be European stability and reduction of tensions, how-
ever, only if--lacking reunification of Germany--only if we--
and Bonn--accept the reality of the East German state and the 
Oder-Niesse line. On what basis have we thus far refused to 
accept these realities? The implicit American assumption that 
we had a right to create a West German state but that the Soviet 
Union did not have a right to create an East German state is so 
untenable that we do not even assert it in this fashion, but 
that is what our position amounts to. Do we expect the Soviet 
Union to agree with us and, out of the goodness of its heart 
and love of capitalism, voluntarily turn East Germany over to 
west Germany and force the Poles to give up their new territo-
ries and restore the former Prussian city of Koenigsberg to a 
Germany controlling NATO? If we don't expect this, what do we 
expect? \Vhat do the West Germans expect? Presumably we do not 
intend to try to bring about these changes by force, but can we 
be sure, in the present milieu, the Russians--and the East Ger-
mans and the Poles--understand this? Actually our policy is 
based on utter unreality. But can we expect to reassure the 
Russians by saying, "We know our policy doesn I t make any sense, 
but please believe it just reflects a lack of realism on our 
part rather than an intention to force changes harmful to yoU] 
interests"? 
13 No, of course, we cannot say this~ Nor does our go-
vernment see it this way. Mr. Rusk recently referred to what 
he called "the many contradictions and historical fallacies in 
the present position of the Soviet leaders (on Germany).u As 
one who accepts and defends the policies of Secretar'ies Acheson 
and Dulles on Germany, Mr. Rusk ought to know a lot about con-
tradictions and historical fallacies. But sometimes too much 
of a concern with the mote in the eyes of others obscures the 
mote in one's own eye. 
~here has been a lot of talk about taking the initia-
ti ve away from the Communists, and this is long overdue'. The 
present Berlin situation would be a good place to start. In-
deed, if we ~e not prepared to risk war in a vain attempt to 
preserve a "status quo" ·that cannot be preserved and does not 
~volve our vital interest in any event, and if we do not wish 
to accept that Soviet proposal, there is no alternative to tak-
ing the initiative. And in one sense that is just what Khru-
shchev is inviting us to do. Maybe we can't come up with a 
workable proposal, but we will never know until we try. There 
are a number of obvious proposals that could be made. Senator 
Mansfield has offered one--creating a united Berlin as a free 
cj,.ty guaranteed by both NATO and Warsaw Pact and policed by "in-
ternational peace teams." The Mansfield proposal may not be al-
together realistic, but it is, at least, a proposal. Another 
would be demilitarization of both East and West Berlin, with the 
latter in a special status. United Nations supervision of West 
Berlin is also a possibility. A joint East-West German con-
dominium of the whole of Berlin is still another, and this by 
no means exhausts the possibilities. But if we are to have 
anything better than the Russians suggest, we must take the 
initiative and propose something. The West Germans. of course, 
will not like it. It is high time, I think, that the West 
Germans be put in their place on this matter. It is high 
time that American policy assert itself in behalf of real 
American interests, not imagined American interes~s or West 
German interests. I can think of no better place to start 
than for our national leaders to make realistic r ·3.ther than 
propaganda statements aboll.t the whole issue to the American 
people. It is such a course that takes real courage, rather 
than the pseudo courage about standi~g firm and going to war, 
and it is real courage alone that will preserve our interests 
and integrity and at the same time spare us a thermonuclear 
war. Which kind of courage our present leaders have, we may be 
soon about to see. 
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